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NOTES AND COMMENT
it would seem that the Montana view has considerable support
and is better reasoning. It is doubted that any state would fol-
low the dictum of the Montana court in holding that the mere
fact that the promisee could not take until the creditors had been
satisfied would be a sufficient reason to grant specific perform-
ance. Of course, it is apparent that if there was an actual intent
that the claimant would be compensated for the "reasonable
value" of the services, a different problem would be presented.
There is a danger present in filing a claim as a creditor as it
may have the effect of precluding an action for specific perform-
ance as an election of remedy. It is generally held, in the ab-
sence of extenuating circumstances that such presentment of a
claim as a creditor is a bar to an action of specific performance.'
Montana would no doubt follow the general rule, but certain
facts can be presented whereby the filing does not constitute a
final election.'
It must be kept in mind, however, in determining what pro-
cedure will best benefit your client, that an election to bring suit
for specific performance may place the claimant in a worse posi-
tion than if a claim is filed against the estate for breach of con-
tract. Should the estate. be insolvent, the creditors will be satis-
fied first and the claimant will share with the distributees on a
pro-rata basis from the remainder; thus the situation may arise
whereby he will receive nothing at all, or possibly only a reduced
amount.
JOHN R. DAVIDSON
'"Laird v. Laird, 115 Mich. 352, 73 N.W. 382 (1897) ; Reich v. Misch, 316
Mich. 264, 25 N.W. 2d. 57 (1946) ; Ballou v. First National Bank, 98
Colo. 101, 53 P.2d. 592 (1935).
'aRowe v. Eggum, 107 Mont. 378, 87 P.2d. 189 (1938). It is not an elec-
tion of remedies so as to bar an action for specific performance when
made under a mistake of rights.
SUBROGATION CLAIMS IN INSURANCE AND
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE
The purpose of this article is to discuss the Real Party in
Interest Statue, and its particular application to Insurance Law.
Almost every state in the union now has a statute, which in effect
is a real party in interest statute. Section 93-2801, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947 provides:
"Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest, except . . ." (Exceptions not
applicable).
This statute had as its origin the New York Code, where this pro-
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vision was adopted in 1848. The framers of that code said that
"he who has the right, is the person to pursue the remedy. We
have adopted this rule."' The Supreme Court of Montana has
stated the purpose of the statute. In Federal Land Bank of Spo-
kane v. Green,' the court said that the purpose is to protect the
adversary from another suit for the same cause of action, but by
a different party. Again, the court defined the real party in in-
terest statute in Lefebure v. Baker,' stating that the party whose
right has been invaded is the person in whom is the right of ac-
tion. The court further stated that if no right or interest in the
subject matter of the controversy is present, either personal or
fiduciary, then a cause of action cannot be stated concerning that
subject matter.
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine that has become well
established in the law. It protects one secondarily liable, by al-
lowing him to recover against the principal obligor, in the same
capacity as could the creditor in the first instance. Subrogation
applies to Insurance Law, as well as other fields. "An insurer
required by contract to indemnify the insured for any loss suf-
fered is entitled to be subrogated to any legal rights belonging
to the insured at the time of loss by virtue of which he might
have compelled another to make compensation in whole or in part
for such loss. "'
Who may or must bring the action against the wrongdoer
becomes of major import where the insurer is subrogated to the
rights of the insured.
At Common Law, the rights of action were very limited. The
court would only recognize certain causes of action, and only
those parties who had legal title to the specific choses in action
could sue thereon. Generally, the courts at common law said that
an action against the wrongdoer must be brought by the insured;
later the court allowed such an action to be maintained by the
insurer in the name of the insured. The legal capacity of the
insurer himself, however, was never recognized at common law.
The Potomac,' an early Federal case, said that the action must
be brought in the name of the insured, because he had legal title.
The action had to be maintained in the name of the one who had
a legal estate in the property damaged. Another Federal case"
'Clark, Real Party in Interest, 38 Yale L.J. 259, (1925).
2(1939) 108 M. 56, 90 P.(2) 489.
3(1923) 69 M. 193, 220 P. 111.
4Vance on Insurance, Third Edition, at page 786.
5105 U.S. 630,26 L.Ed. 1194 (1882).
6Aetna, Ins. C. v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co., 3 Dill. 1, Fed. Case No. 96
(1874).
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held that the action must be brought in the name of the, insured,
because he had legal title, and the wrongful act was single and
indivisible, giving rise to only one cause of action. A recent
Canadian case, Brown v. B.C. Electric R.C.,' shows that this rule
at common law still exists, the court holding that an insurer who
has not taken an assignment of the policy is neither a proper nor
a necessary party plaintiff, but must maintain the action against
the wrongdoer in the name of the insured.
Equity, from very early time looked through these pro-
cedural requirements to the substance, allowing those who had an
interest in the controversy to appear before it, so as to settle
the dispute in one hearing with speed in the administration of
justice.
The Codes of Civil Procedure abolished the distinction be-
tween law and equity. There was to be only one court, admin-
istering both what had been known as law and equity. This
merger resulted in one court adjudicating the cause of action,
whether it existed at common law or in equity. The main require-
ment established by the framers of the codes was that the plain-
tiff be the real party in interest. As Clark says, "The real party
in interest is he who by substantive law has the right of action.
The codes were not intended to change substantive law. Thus,
in this. view, whoever formerly had a legal or equitable right of
action has such right still. "'
In Gaugler v. Chicago, M. P. S. Ry. Co., the federal district
court sitting in Montana said that insurers, upon payment giving
rise to subrogation, are equitable assignees. The court said:
"These insurers by subrogation are equitable as-
signees, proportionate to the payments by them made to
the insured, of parts of the insured's right of action
against defendant, the insured retaining part to himself.
This assignment takes on all the aspect, in effect, of one
by the most formal and express deed. (Citing cases)."
This quotation emphasizes the necessity of reference to assign-
ment cases in order to draw analogies between them and cases in-
volving subrogation of insurance claims.
Under the merged procedure of law and equity, an assignee
of a complete debt has the right to maintain the action therefor
in his own name, as the real party in interest. In Puterbaugh v.
McCray, the California Court of Appeals said that when an as-
'(1925) B.C. 3 Dom. L.R. 734.
'Op. Cit., note 1.
(1912) 197 F. 79 (D. Mont.).1(1914) 25 Cal. App. 469, 144 P. 149.
3
Lalonde: Subrogation Claims in Insurance and the Real Party in Interest St
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1955
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
signment is complete so as to vest the entire beneficial interest in
the asignee, that person is the real party in interest, and entitled
to maintain the action in his own name, whether the assignment
be designated as legal or equitable. The Indiana Court said, in
relation to a right to inspect a corporation's books, "The assignee
to whom the entire beneficial interest in the shares had been
transferred by an equitable assignment, which needed only a
presentation of the certificate to convey the legal title, was the
real party in interest in an action with relation to the stock so
assigned. (Citing cases) "' Montana has held in line with this,
provided the assignment is real and substantial as distinct from
simulated or sham, regardless of whether the assignee receives a
legal or equitable interest." The contrary view was expressed in
Farmers' Exchange v. Walter M. Lowney Co.,' in which the
Vermont Supreme Court said that an assiggnee could maintain
an action in his own name, under a statute so authorizing it, only
if he were the assignee of a legal assignment. Vermont at this
time had separate courts of law and equity, which would explain
and distinguish this case from the other authority cited. The
view expressed by Vermont Court has been taken by those courts
holding strictly with the common law, but the majority rule under
a merger of law and equity is contrary.
When an insurer is completely subrogated to the claim
against the wrongdoer, by payment of the entire loss to the in-
sured, the general rule is that the insurer is the real party in in-
terest, and any action therefor must be maintained in his name."
The Oregon Supreme Court, in State Ins. Co. v. Oregon R. &
Nav. Co., held that when the payment is equal to or exceeds the
value of the property, the insured no longer has any pecuniary
interest in the action against the wrongdoer. The California Ap-
pellate Court, in Lebet v. Cappobiacho," held that the action must
be brought in the name of the insurer because the insured is no
longer the real party in interest. One case of interest is Cum-
mingham & Hinshaw v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.," in which
the North Carolina Court said, in denying a suit by the insured
for damages when he had been paid in full by the insurer, that
the insurer was the sole real party in interest under the statute.
'S. F. Bowser d Co. Inc. v. State ex rel Hines, 192 Ind. 462, 137 N.E.
57 (1922).
"'State ex rel Freeboun v. Met. Credit Ser., 140 M. 76, 66 P. (2) 337
(1937) ; Streetbeck v. Benson, 107 M. 110, 80 P.(2) 861 (1939).
-95 Vt. 445, 115 A. 507 (1921).
""See Words & Phrases, 201-214 for cases so holding.
"(1891) 20 Ore. 563, 26 P. 838.
1(1940) 38 Cal. App. (Supp) (2) 771, 102 P.(2) 1109.
"(1905) 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029, 2 L.R.A. (NS) 921.
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This case emphasizes the general rule as stated previously, show-
ing that the insured has ben divested of any interest in the cause
of action, so cannot be the real party in interest. Justice Pound,
in Lord & Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,' said:
"The action properly should have been brought in
the name of the insurance company alone. No other
party has any interest in the claim. (Citing cases) The
practice of joining the insured as a plaintiff when it re-
tains no interest in the subject matter of the action is
not to be commended."
The rule expressed by the majority of the courts applies
whether the insurer pays the whole loss to the insured, or the
insured has been partly paid by the insurer and partly by the
wrongdoer. In City of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice,' the Kansas
Supreme Court said, in reference to the right of action being
vested in the insurer, in his own name:
"This is equally true whether the loss has been fully
covered by insurance or partly covered by the insurance
and partly by payment by the wrongdoer. The essential
fact is that the insured no longer has a financial interest
in the outcome. It also, follows that in such a situation
the consent of the insured to action by the insurer is not
necessary. "
This should preclude any valid controversy over the problem of
the real party in interest when an insurance company makes pay-
ment to the insured of his entire loss. But some courts have held
contrary. In Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Hicklin, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals said that the wrongdoer was not entitled to the
benefit of the insurance taken out by the insured. Consequently,
he could not defend an action by the owner for damages, on the
ground that he was not the real party in interest. The court
cited an early English case and an early Tennessee case as
authority.' In those cases, the opinion of the justices was that
the insured had legal title, had paid premiums, and therefore
the action should be prosecuted as if no insurance was involved,
or as if no payments had been made to the insured. This position
does not seem to be consistent with either the purpose of the real
party in interest statute to prevent multiplicity, or the definition
of that statute as refering to the person who is entitled to the
-(1920) 230 N.Y. 132, 129 N.E. 346.
9(1944) 159 Kan. 176, 162 P.(2) 836, 157 A.L.R. 1233.
"( 1 9 0 9 ) 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752, 23 L.R.A. (NS) 870.
"Mason v. Sansbury, 3 Doug. 61 (1781) ; Anderson v. Miller, 96 Term, 35,
54 Am. S. Rep. 812 (1896).
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fruits of the action. The Kentucky case might have been de-
cided upon other grounds if the court had distinguished complete
payment of the loss from payment of less than the loss. It ap-
pears that in that case, the insurer was actually not the sole real
party in interest, but rather, the insured retained an interest in
the subject matter and had a right to maintain the action.
This introduces the discussion of the second class of cases
involved when subrogation claims are in controversy. First an
examination of the cases involving partial assignments will be
made before reference is made to cases involving partial sub-
rogation or payment of less than the loss.
In Risley v. Phoenix Bank of City of New York,' the New
York Court said:
"The claim that there can be no valid assignment of
a part of an entire debt or obligation is opposed to the
well-settled rule in this State. (Citing cases). The point
was ruled in the same way by the court of the King's
Bench in Tibbits v. George. The tendency of modern de-
cisions is in the direction of more fully protecting the
equitable rights of assignees of choses in action, and the
objection that to allow an assignment of part of an entire
claim might subject the creditor to several actions to en-
force a single obligation, has much less force under a
system which required all parties in interest to be joined
as parties to the action."
In the Gaugler case,' Judge Bourquin said:
"The point here involved does not seem to have been
expressly decided by the Montana Supreme Court, but in
Caledonia Ins. Co. v. Railway Co., an insurance company
appears to have maintained without question an action,
in its own name and alone, against a trespassor for re-
covery for a partial loss payment by it made to the in-
sured. And it is common knowledge of the bench and
bar of Montana that, on the theory that assignees in
whole or in part of a chose in action are real parties in
interest within the statutes of the state, since the enact-
ment of said statutes, assignees of entire choses have sued
in their own names and assignees of part thereof have
sued jointly with their assignors in the names of both,
either without question or questioned unavailingly."
Therefore, it would seem that a partial assignee could maintain
the action for a debt or obligation in his own name, as the real
party in interest. It is true that the language of the Montana
-(1880) 83 N.Y. 318, 38 Am. Rpts. 421.
'0 p. Cit., note 9.
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Supreme Court, in LaBante v. Insurance Co.,' seems to indicate
a contrary view. In this case, the court said that a partial as-
signment was not valid against a debtor unless the debtor con-
sented. This conclusion was based upon the theory that to de-
cide otherwise would allow a material change in the obligation,
subjecting the debtor to two claims. But in this particular case,
the court had previously determined that there was no assignment
because there was no acceptance by the assignee. The case has
never been cited as authority for the proposition that there can-
not be a partial assignment without the consent of the debtor,
and would seem to be very doubtful authority.
The problem of partial subrogation occurs frequently. The
tendency of insurance companies to issue deductible policies,
where the insured pays the initial loss before the insurer becomes
liable upon the contract of insurance, the fact that several in-
surance companies may be joined in the coverage of a particular
property, and the principle of over insurance' all contribute to
this situation.
The weight of authority in the code states, when payment
is less that the loss, is that the action must be maintained by the
insured, or in his name. In Harrington v. Central States Ins.
Co.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained this proposition,
stating that there is but one right of action, and it could not be
split. This contention by the majority of the courts appears to
be based upon the theory that the insured retains legal title in
the cause of action, and in order to bring about a complete set-
tlement of the controversy in one case, it being single and in-
divisible, the insured must bring such an action. The proceeds
will be divided between the insured and the insurer according to
their pro rata interests, because the insured will be required to
hold the proceeds as a trustee for the insurer. The cases holding
with the majority cite Aetna Ins. Co. v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co.,'
in which Judge Dillon said:
"The property destroyed exceeded in value the
amount insured and the rule of law has been long settled
2(1925) 75 M. 1, 241 P. 631.
2It is well established Insurance Law that insuring one's property for
more than its actual value is not proper. The reason for this is that
the purpose of insurance, indemnity, would not be fulfilled; rather
gambling for a possible gain would result. But attention should be
called to Section 40-905, R.C.M., 1947, in relation to over-insurance,
which sets up a presumption that the face value of the policy is the
value of the property lost. No decision has been reported construing the
effect of this section.
"(1934) 169 Okla. 255, 36 P.(2) 738, 96 A.L.R. 859.
2 7 0p. Cit., note 6.
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that the insurance company, on the payment of the loss,
cannot sue the wrongdoer who occasioned it, in its own
name. The suit, though for the use of the insurer, must
be in the name of the person whose property was de-
stroyed. The wrongful act was single and indivisible
and gives rise to but one liability. If one insurer may
sue, then, if there are a dozen, each may sue for the bal-
ance. This is not permitted .... But it is insisted that
the provision of the Missouri statute, that every action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in in-
terest, though it declares that the provision shall not
authorize the assignment of a thing in action not arising
out of a contract, changes the rule. However, it might
be if the amount paid by the insurer to the assured had
equalled or exceeded the value of the property, and the
assured had made a full assignment, it is plain that this
case falls within all the reasons of the rule itself, and
which is the foundation of the law on this subject."
It should be noted that the court gave leave to amend, but be-
cause this would destroy diversity of citizenship it was imprac-
ticable, and the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit. This indicates
that the real issue was over nonjoinder and not real parties in
interest.
It appears, upon an analogy with partial assignments, that
the majority rulo is not sound. Mr. Clark says :'
"It would seem perfectly natural to proceed with the
analogy of subrogation to assignments in those frequent
cases where the insurance does not cover the loss, and to
determine the real parties in interest as with partial as-
signments. This theory would make both insurer and in-
sured necessary parties, permitting each to sue on join-
ing the other as plaintiff or defendant. (Citing cases)."
In Caledonia Ins. Co. v. N.R.R. Co.," the Supreme Court of
Montana allowed an action to be maintained by the insurer, when
the payment was less than the loss suffered by the insured. There
the insured's building was destroyed, having a value of $1,068.
The insurer paid the full face value of the policy, $800, and sued
the wrongdoer for the sum, plus interest thereon. This suit was
maintained in the name of the insurance company, without join-
ing the insured, even though the insured had a substantial interest
in the recovery against the wrongdoer. A judgment was returned
for the insurer, with the interest prayed for. The court said:
"If the Insurance Company had purchased Mrs.
"0p. Cit., note 1.
=(1905) 32 N. 46, 79 P. 544.
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Harn's (Insured) entire cause of action against the Rail-
way Company, it would have been placed in her shoes,
and entitled to assert whatever claims she might have
asserted, and that claim, as we have seen, was one for the
value of the property destroyed, and interest thereon,
if in their discretion the jury saw fit to allow interest;
and we are unaware of any principle of law or reason
which will deny the Insurance Company its pro rata in-
terest in that right, when, as in this instance, it became
subrogated to only a portion of the claim instead of the
whole of it."
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a similar result has
been reached. In State Farm Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. U. S.,' the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held:
"In view of the universally recognized equitable
principle of subrogation, an insurance company having
paid the whole loss, is the real party in interest within the
meaning of Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, (Citing cases) ... In the case at bar, appellant is
only a partial subrogee, which may involve a problem of
splitting causes of action. We think that a partial sub-
rogee is a real party in interest, under Rule 17 (a), and
as such has standing to sue in his own name, subject only
to the right of the defendant, by making timely objec-
tion, to insist upon joinder of the other parties in inter-
est in order to avoid a split-up of the cause of action.
(Citing cases) The United States was not put to the
necessity of insisting upon such joinder in the present
case, because the partial subrogee and the insured, on
their own initiative joined in a single complaint which
brought all the parties in interest before the court below.
We see no possible objection to this procedure."
Although the main question in the Caledonia case was wheth-
er the insurance company was entitled to interest, through its
right of subrogation, it surely should stand as authority that
the insurer is a real party in interest even though he is only a
partial subrogee. Since, however, the issue of parties in interest
was not raised, the weight of the case as authority is somewhat
limited. The exact point has not been before the Supreme Court
of Montana, but in the Gaugler case, supra, the issue was raised,
and the federal court held that a partial subrogee is a real party
in interest. In the Tice case, ' the Kansas Supreme Court, in set-
ting future standards as a guide to the bar, said:
"1. Where the loss has not been fully covered by
'0(1949) 172 Fed. (2) 737.
"'Op. Cit., note 19.
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the insurance payment, and the property owner still as-
serts a claim against the wrongdoer. In this case both
he and the insurer are real parties in interest, but action
should be brought by the property owner, who will hold
as trustee for the insurer in respect to such part of the
amount recovered as the insurer has been compelled to
pay under the policy. If, in such a situation, the prop-
erty owner refuses to bring action, justice requires that
the insurer be permitted to bring the action."
This quotation supports the proposition that the insurer paying
part of the loss to the insured, is a real party in interest, and as
such, should be able to maintain the action therefor in his own
name. The argument against splitting of causes of action would
be avoided by application of the compulsory joinder statute, and
all parties necessary to the complete determination of the con-
troversy could be brought before the court.
These authorities would lend support to Clark's analogy,
supra, and cases of partial subrogation would be treated on the
same basis as cases of partial assignment. The partial subrogee
or assignee would be a real party in interest and could maintain
an action for recovery, subject only to the right of the defendant
to require joinder of the parties united in interest. Montana
Statutes contain a compulsory joinder provision,' requiring that
all parties united in interest be joined as plaintiff or defendant.
Certainly, this would be a better result than that reached by the
majority of the courts; giving effect to the reason for and pur-
pose of the real party in interest statute, without becoming con-
fused with problems with respect to joinder of parties.
In this connection, the effect of failure to answer or demur
on the ground that the plaintiff is not a real party in interest
should be considered. The Revised Codes of Montana provide
that the defendant may demur to the complaint, when it appears
upon the face thereof either that there is a defect or misjoinder
of parties plaintiff or defendant, or that the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ;' and they
also provide that when these matters do not appear upon the
face of the complaint, the objection may be taken by answer."
Further, if no objection is taken, either by demurrer or answer,
the defendant must be deemed to have waived the same, except-
ing only that the objection that the complaint does not state
'Section 93-2821, R.C.M., 1947.
"Section 93-3301, R.C.M., 1947.
"Section 93-3305, R.C.M, 1947.
10
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facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' In Lefebure v.
Baker," the Montana Supreme Court said:
"An action at law implies by its very terms the ex-
istence of a person who has the right to bring the ac-
tion....
A cause of action is the right which a party has to
institute a judicial proceeding (Citing cases), and to
state a cause of action the plaintiff must disclose his in-
terest in the subject matter of the litigation; or, in other
words, he must make it appear that he is the real party
in interest. It is elementary that the complaint must not
only disclose a complete cause of action against the de-
fendant, it must also show a right of action in the plain-
tiff."
The plaintiff both in his pleading and in his proof must show that
he is the person entitled to recovery on the cause of action before
he can do so. It is not sufficient that the right of action be in
someone, it must be in the person suing.
This language seems to indicate that the necessity of being
a real party in interest goes to the very essence of the right to
maintain an action. If this be true, then the failure to object to
the same, by demurrer or answer, should not effect the defense.
The objection that the complaint does not state a cause of action
is never waived,' and may be raised for the first time on ap-
peal.' The defect of misjoinder or nonjoinder is a different mat-
ter and is waived by failure to demur or answer.
In conclusion, it appears that the real party in interest
statute will effect actions by insurers who have paid losses. Pay-
ment of the entire loss makes the insurer the sole real party in
interest; but payment of less results in both the insured and the
insurer being real parties in interest. Either should be able to
maintain the action against the wrongdoer for the damages
caused by his negligence. This right in either party to maintain
the action should be subject only to the right of the wrongdoer
to require joinder of necessary additional parties, under a com-
pulsory joinder statute, so as to prevent multiplicity by having
all the parties before the court in the one suit. Failure of the
defendant to raise the issue should not constitute a waiver of
the right of the defendant to successfully defend a suit by the
'Section 93-3306, R.C.M., 1947.
sMop. Cit., note 3.
'"Clark v. Ore. Short Line RR Co., 38 M. 1770 99 P. 298 (1909) ; Hand v.
He8let, 81 M. 68, 261 P. 609 (1927).
"Tracy v. Harmon., 17 M. 465, 43 P. 500 (1896) ; State ex tel Ch1I. etc. R.
Co. v. Dist. Ct., 105 M. 396, 73 P.(2) 204 (1937).
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insured who has been paid in full; but failure of the defendant
to raise the issue of defect of parties should constitute a waiver
of the right to object to suit by either the insured or the insurer
alone, in case of partial payment for the loss by the insurer.
EUGENE A. LALONDE.
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